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Why Donor iDentiFiCation 
oF ‘Fragile states’ has  
been imPortant 
Over the last decade, the international development community 
has been increasingly concerned about a set of poor developing 
countries, which today are labelled ‘fragile states’. The concern with 
‘fragile’ states took on particular importance after those responsible 
for the attacks on the World Trade Centre on September 11, 2001, 
were linked to Afghanistan – a weak and porous state crippled by 
decades of war.  While CSRC research has questioned the idea that 
terrorist threats to the rich countries arise primarily in the south 
(Beall et al 2006), the identification of so-called ‘fragile states’ as 
an important focus of attention for bilateral and multilateral aid 
donors is welcome for three reasons.
First, the donor community’s turn to pay greater attention to the 
weakest states has allowed a larger share of external assistance 
from the rich countries to reach the countries most in need.  During 
the 1990s, with the rise of the ‘good governance’ agenda, aid 
was directed increasingly towards the ‘best performers’. Looking 
at the 22 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa that the World Bank 
considered as ‘fragile states’ by 2009 (identified through the 
CPIA index discussed below), bilateral assistance began to decline 
in 1990 recovering and beginning to grow again only in 2001. 
Whether or not the trend toward directing more assistance to 
these countries will survive the inevitable reduction in overseas 
aid in the wake of the OECD countries’ financial crisis remains 
to be seen.  
Second, the identification of state fragility has put state building at 
the top of the international development agenda (OECD 2010), the 
need for which is clearly identified in CSRC research. The OECD’s 
Principles for Good Engagement with Fragile States and Situations 
(2007, par.3) commits donor countries to ‘focus on state-building 
as the central objective’. After many years of liberal discourse 
that was concerned primarily with down-sizing the state, the 
Principles recognise that donors need to ‘strengthen the capability 
of states to fulfil their core functions’ including ‘ensuring security 
and justice’ and ‘mobilising revenue’. This has been reinforced in 
other international forums (Dili Declaration, 2010). 
The third positive contribution of recent policy moves has been 
the recognition in the revised version of the Principles that there 
are not only fragile states, but also ‘fragile situations’ within 
otherwise stable states. This is in line with the CSRC proposition 
that states perform differentially over time and within their 
territory (for instance in different cities, (Beall et al 2010a)) and 
in relation to different state functions, and they may move in and 
out of conditions of fragility. This moves away from a tendency 
to pathologise states, so common in the ‘failed states’ discourse 
highlights: 
•  The new importance of ‘fragile states’ on the international 
development agenda has directed more aid resources 
to countries most in need and made state-building a 
legitimate object of international support. 
•  However, the definitions of ‘state fragility’, which 
guide resource allocation and programme design, are 
problematic and miss the most important question: why 
are some poor countries unstable and particularly subject 
to violence and warfare while others have achieved long 
periods of peace even in conditions of poverty and low 
economic growth?
•  CSRC research demonstrates that the reigning definitions 
of state fragility can divert attention away from the factors 
most likely to provoke conflict in the poorest countries 
and cause misunderstanding of the factors that have 
allowed states to sustain peace. In the worst cases these 
definitions have led international actors to advocate 
inappropriate reforms, which aggravate fragility.
•  State fragility is being used as a catch-all phrase for 
conflict, post-conflict, humanitarian crisis-prone or 
chronically poverty stricken states, but our research shows 
that these comprise both ‘fragile’ and ‘resilient’ states, 
where policy choices are starkly different.
•  The distinctions between ‘fragile’, ‘resilient’ and 
‘developmental’ states create specific and different 
challenges in terms of what is required for state-
building and what security, governance and economic 
reforms are appropriate.
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2(Di John 2008) and argues against applying uniform ‘governance 
templates’ without taking into account the historically and spatially 
specific dimensions of fragility (OECD 2010).
What is Wrong With  
the Donor DeFinition oF 
state Fragility?
Despite the achievements in recognising a condition of ‘fragility’, 
the definitions being used by the international community remain 
extremely problematic. A working consensus definition has 
emerged among bilateral donors around the OECD’s Principles, 
which proclaim that, ‘States are fragile when state structures 
lack political will and/or capacity to provide the basic functions 
needed for poverty reduction, development and to safeguard 
the security and human rights of their populations’ (OECD 2007). 
Operationally, the World Bank has deployed the Country Policy 
and Institutional Assessment (based on in-house expert opinion 
designed to allocate concessional grants) to identify fragile states 
as those with no CPIA score or scoring 3.2 or less  (World Bank, 
2010: 222) – the problems of which are discussed in another 
CSRC Policy Direction (Gutierrez 2010a).
The OECD definition of state fragility fails to distinguish between 
the particular conditions of ‘fragility’ and the general conditions 
of ‘underdevelopment’. By definition all poor countries lack 
the capacity to reduce poverty and promote development. The 
whole problem of ‘state fragility’ is to understand why some 
poor countries are unstable and have been particularly subject 
to violence and warfare and others, like Tanzania and Zambia, 
have achieved long periods of peace even in conditions of poverty 
and low economic growth (Gutierrez et al 2010b and 2010a). A 
definition of ‘state fragility’ that is useful for policy intervention 
needs to highlight what distinguishes fragile states from the rest of 
low income developing countries. Clearly, Afghanistan (Giustozzi 
2008) and the Democratic Republic of Congo (Hesselbein 2007), 
like Somalia and Haiti, where state organisations hardly function 
and where wave upon wave of violent conflict or war have 
prevented a modicum of state consolidation are in a different 
category than Tanzania or Zambia, or Malawi, where poverty 
remains profound but people generally live in peace.
The reigning definitions of fragility do not recognise the importance 
of the achievements of states like those in Tanzania or Zambia 
in establishing a significant degree of ‘resilience’ (Putzel and 
Lindemann 2010; Di John 2010a). The counterpoint to state 
fragility is not development, but state resilience, which may be 
a stepping stone to more dynamic development, or a plateau 
marked by economic stagnation, beyond which it is difficult to 
pass. This appears to be a rather large category of countries in the 
developing world. Many middle income countries in the developing 
world appear to have achieved significant state resilience, but have 
great difficulty in presiding over a developmental take-off. But, 
from the vantage point of people in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo or Afghanistan establishing states presiding over ‘resilient 
stagnation’ would represent a huge leap forward. 
Finally, the way ‘state fragility’ is defined loses sight of the huge 
distance that must be traversed from both conditions of fragility and 
stagnant resilience to a situation where the state is presiding over 
accelerated growth and poverty reduction. A ‘developmental state’ 
has to be able to create incentives and conditions for the holders 
of wealth to invest in productivity-raising economic ventures and 
incentives and conditions for labouring people to work for wages. 
This is all the more crucial since the movement of people from rural 
to urban employment, the transformation in forms of agricultural 
production and in urban and rural property rights required for 
capitalist development can well be new sources of conflict (Beall 
et al 2010b). Achieving state resilience, even at low levels of 
development, allows a period of state consolidation – the evolution 
of a shared national identity, acceptance of territorial boundaries 
and the recognition of national law – which can provide the basis 
to withstand the conflictual dimensions of development.
a DeFinition oF ‘state 
Fragility’ that is useFul  
to DeveloPment aCtors 
The CSRC has anchored its definition of state fragility in a coherent 
and well established theoretical tradition, around four basic 
attributes of the state (Gutiérrez et al 2010b). The key defining 
characteristic of fragility is the failure of the state to exercise a 
monopoly over the legitimate use of force – e.g. the failure to 
protect the population from large-scale violence and to ensure 
that non-state armed actors cannot rival the state’s security forces 
(armies and police). The second indicator of fragility is the failure 
of the state to develop basic bureaucratic capacity, identified in 
our qualitative research by assessing the extent to which the 
state has achieved a monopoly over legitimate taxation powers 
iDentiFying signs oF state 
Fragility in uganDa
After coming to power in Uganda in 1986, the National Resistance Movement (NRM) 
led by President Yoweri Museveni made great strides in launching a development 
programme rightly supported and celebrated by the international donor community 
(Golooba-Mutebi 2007). With the reigning definition of state fragility, the NRM 
state could be said to be performing well: promising economic reforms, pioneering 
poverty reduction strategy, and impressive fight against HIV/AIDS. However, if 
examined through the lens of state fragility and resilience that we propose here, 
signs of fragility were evident right from the start. 
In terms of security, the government faced no less than seven significant armed 
insurgencies, which are estimated to have led to as many as 500,000 deaths. There 
remain worries about the integrity of the army and the extent to which its top 
positions are mostly occupied by individuals from Museveni’s home region – recalling 
exclusionary patterns in the army under early regimes, which contributed to the 
outbreak of civil war. The NRM has only had partial success in ensuring the state’s 
territorial reach and its conduct of the war with successive insurgent movements in 
the North has even led to some calls for secession (Lindemann 2010a). Looking at 
taxation, the still weak project of the Buganda Kingdom to build its own fiscal system 
based on earnings from land rents and other assets, plus corporate, household and 
individual voluntary contributions (Englebert 2002) operates as a potential rival 
to the state’s monopoly over taxation. Riots in Kampala in 2009 were a sign that 
the state’s exclusionary practices towards Baganda elites may be alienating the 
wider population (Goodfellow 2010). Museveni’s presidency, for all its successes, 
has performed poorly in promoting the pre-eminence of state institutions in the 
face of rival institutional frameworks anchored in regionally and ethnically based 
communities (Lindemann 2010a).  The President’s highly personalised rule and the 
sluggishness with which he approached the institutionalisation of reforms did not 
contribute well to universalising state institutions in the face of rival institutions of 
the Buganda Kingdom. Had attention been paid to issues of institutional multiplicity, 
then the international community would have been less surprised at seeing this 
major fissure of fragility in the state.
3(Di John 2009). Our qualitative research has identified a third 
characteristic of fragility as the failure of the state to ensure that 
its institutions (or rules) trump rival rules anchored in non-state 
institutional systems. In our quantitative research we identified a 
fourth characteristic of fragility as a significant deficit in territorial 
control (Gutiérrez et al 2010b). All four sets of characteristics are 
observable, mostly measurable, distinguish fragile from resilient 
states, and avoid confusing fragility with a general lack of progress 
in achieving development and democracy. 
Promoting development - or progress towards accelerated growth 
and poverty reduction - requires both transcendence of basic 
fragility and the creation of further state capacity to promote an 
intensification of economic integration within a state’s territory 
and a step-change in productivity in agriculture, manufacturing, 
wider industry, trade and key service delivery. Unsurprisingly, 
qualitative and quantitative research provides plenty of evidence 
that achieving a developmental take-off is the best insulation 
against a decline into fragility. 
Why it is imPortant to 
Distinguish ‘Fragility’  
From ‘resilienCe’
There are at least three strategic reasons why it makes a difference 
in terms of policy to get the definition of state fragility right. First, 
this focuses attention on the areas of state weakness most likely to 
provoke violence. Second, it cautions against undermining patterns of 
state activity that have actually underpinned resilience. Third, it informs 
decisions about what are and are not appropriate reforms.
1.  The CSRC definition of fragility focuses attention on the 
factors that are most likely to provoke or sustain violence 
and conflict as demonstrated by our research:
 •   Monopoly of violence: In the Democratic Republic of Congo, 
the international community placed most of its attention on 
working towards elections and establishing poverty reduction 
projects in the hope that progress on these fronts could 
compensate for slow or no progress in building an integrated 
national army. But the failure to ensure the creation of an army 
with a functioning chain of command, the need for which 
was evident before the elections (Hesselbein 2007), led to 
the persistence of major outbreaks of violence not only in the 
conflict-prone Eastern DRC but in Equateur, Bandundu and 
Kinshasa (ICG 2010). With no common stance towards the 
Kabila government, external actors have attempted to promote 
bilateral and piecemeal programmes of police reform and 
military training, which so far appear to have been ineffective 
in establishing the foundations of peace in the country. 
 •   Territorial reach of the state: Over many years, governments in 
the Philippines and Colombia have failed to project the state’s 
authority to the furthest reaches of their territory (Gutiérrez et 
al 2007; Lara forthcoming). This was not a state-threatening 
issue for as long as these territories were sparsely populated, 
produced very little wealth, and no significant conflict was 
spilling into them from neighbouring countries. However, 
with time these conditions have changed and territories 
beyond the reach of the state began to see the colonisation 
and establishment of rival authority by militant movements, 
financiers of illegal drugs production and trade and increased 
presence of armed actors from neighbouring conflicts.  
 •   The fiscal monopoly of the state: While all states need 
to pay attention to establishing a basic taxation capacity 
and improve it over time, from the vantage point of 
state fragility, what matters most is not how much tax 
is collected, but whether or not the state has achieved a 
preeminent position in taxation over non-state entities (Di 
John 2010b).  Considerable amounts of customs revenue 
are lost in most poor countries through tax evasion and 
smuggling, as is evident in resilient countries like Tanzania and 
Zambia. However, when smuggling is controlled by political 
organisations determined to challenge the state as in the 
DRC and Afghanistan, or when communities, enterprises 
or those moving goods through the country are forced to 
buy protection from such organisations (Philippines and 
Colombia), this becomes an important source of conflict 
(Lara, forthcoming; Gutiérrez et al 2007). 
2.  The understanding of fragility presented here would lead 
development actors to support and value state achievements 
that have underpinned state resilience, where risks of violence 
have been reduced and the conditions for gradual nation 
and state formation achieved. 
 •   Elite ‘buy-in’ to state rules: Patronage arrangements in the 
state, often at best seen as sources of economic inefficiency 
or at worst as corruption, like the access ruling parties in 
Tanzania and Zambia had to the resources generated from 
marketing boards, or parastatal corporations, provided the 
basis for elite buy-in to state-building projects (Di John 2010a). 
Privileged access today to become partners to foreign interests 
in privatised corporations, or international telecoms firms, 
ensure that elites continue to work in and through the state. 
States need enough resources to enforce property rights and 
enough regulatory authority and financial means to be able 
to provide investment incentives to a cross section of elites.
 •   State as the location of decision making: When access 
to aid resources requires coordination with the state, as 
in Rwanda, or when public revenues and aid receipts are 
distributed through central budgeting processes – even 
when these are highly imperfect - this ensures that the state 
and its executive and legislative offices remain the central 
site of decision making (OECD 2010). This is a necessary 
condition to promote more democratic, representative and 
participatory involvement in decisions of public policy and 
the allocation of resources.
 •   Central state’s leverage over the periphery: Where states 
provide extension services through central state administrative 
organisations, it can reinforce farmers’ loyalty to the state 
lessening their dependence on local landlords (Putzel 1992). 
When redistributive authority exists within the central state 
there is at least the possibility for the state to counteract 
trends of horizontal inequality, where the unequal distribution 
of resources aligns with regional or ethnic divides, particularly 
prone to sparking conflict. 
3.  Appreciating the differences between fragility and resilience will 
allow development actors to avoid advocating inappropriate 
reforms that may actually aggravate fragility
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The templates for economic and political reforms that have been 
advocated by international development actors have seldom been 
informed by an appreciation of the sources of state fragility. This 
has left too much to chance, with reforms sometimes contributing 
to strengthening resilience, but at other times contributing to 
exacerbating state fragility. 
 •   Introducing competitive elections where the grounds of 
citizenship are not accepted, or where demographic patterns 
of ethnic politics mean that a persecuted minority cannot 
achieve a voice, risks increasing violence. In the early 1990s 
pressure on the Rwandan state to introduce competitive 
politics provided fuel to the fire of Hutu génocidaires who 
feared empowering Tutsi communities. Today, a precipitous 
move to elections in the country could unleash a spate of 
political competition based on ethnic hatred. (Putzel and 
Golooba-Mutebi 2010). By contrast, the move to competitive 
politics in Tanzania and even in Zambia (leading to the defeat 
of the ruling party), where citizenship was institutionalised and 
politics largely free of ethnic hatred, did not lead to violence 
(Di John 2010a, Lindemann 2010b).
 •   Downsizing and privatising state enterprises and services without 
the regulatory, taxation, or job-creating investment prospects 
to fill the gaps created leads to increased informalisation of the 
economy and at best the loss of tax revenue but at worst to 
revenues being captured by criminal gangs or groups that plan 
to challenge the state. Privatisation without regulatory powers 
and capacity can increase horizontal inequalities or non-state 
elite capture of national resources (Putzel et al 2005).
 •   Demobilising security forces where soldiers and officers have 
poor chances for finding employment or careers outside the 
military can provoke violent conflict as has surly happened in 
the DRC (Hesselbein 2007). In Rwanda keeping soldiers in 
the army, employed in army-owned businesses or in public 
works has been a guarantor against social violence (Putzel 
and Golooba-Mutebi 2010).
ConClusion
At the core of the problematic definition of state fragility used by 
the international development community is a misguided belief 
that the institutional practices of advanced democracies and 
developed economies need to be transferred all at once to the 
poorest countries. There is also a resistance to identifying that 
some of the practices which have allowed poor states to achieve 
peace and stability – state resilience – violate precepts of market 
liberalism and notions of good governance. Operating with a 
faulty definition of state fragility is not merely bad practice, but 
can actually lead international actors to miss the signs of fragility 
(See Box on Uganda). What is more, the reigning definitions of 
fragility comprise no understanding of “state resilience” in poor 
countries. It is crucial not only to ask why countries like Tanzania 
and Zambia remain so poor, but to ask how and why have they 
remained peaceful. While the move to increase aid efforts and 
attention to the problems of weak states is positive, to improve 
those efforts, and to ensure against practices that might aggravate 
fragility, it is high time a more rigorous definition of state fragility 
is adopted by international actors.  
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